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Abstract:	 This	paper	utilizes	an	otherwise	 standard	micro-founded	general-equilibrium	
setup,	 which	 is	 augmented	 with	 a	 revenue-extraction	 mechanism	 to	 assess	 the	
magnitude	of	VAT	evasion.	The	model	is	calibrated	to	Bulgaria	after	the	introduction	of	
the	currency	board	(1999-2014),	as	one	of	the	very	few	countries	in	Europe	with	a	non-
differentiated	consumption	tax	rate,	and	an	economy	where	VAT	revenue	makes	almost	
half	 of	 total	 government	 tax	 revenue.	 A	 computational	 experiment	 performed	 within	
this	 setup	 estimates	 that	 on	 average,	 the	 size	 of	 evaded	 VAT	 is	 a	 bit	more	 than	 one-
fourth	 of	 output,	 an	 estimate	which	 is	 in	 line	with	 the	 figures	 provided	 in	 both	 Philip	
(2014)	 and	 the	 European	 Commission	 (2014).	 In	 addition,	 model-based	 simulations	
suggest	that	increases	in	spending	on	law	and	order	could	generate	substantial	welfare	
gains	by	decreasing	VAT	evasion.		
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1 Introduction and Motivation
After the fall of the communist regime in 1989, Bulgaria had to reform
its tax system to reflect the new market reality. Both its historical heritage,
and the European spirit of solidarity led to the adoption of a public finance
model that emphasized consumption-based taxation. In what is to follow,
”consumption tax” an ”VAT” will be used interchangeably. Income taxa-
tion in Bulgaria was of much smaller importance for the budget: for exam-
ple, over the period 2007-2014, taxation of individuals constitutes 9-11 %
of overall tax revenue. Yet another reason was the absence of sufficiently
qualified tax administration in the early 1990s. The dynamics of the share
of VAT revenue in total tax revenue in Bulgaria is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1 - Fiscal Importance of VAT Revenue in Bulgaria (1997-2012)
Source: WDI (2015)
As seen from Figure 1 above, VAT revenue is the major source of tax rev-
enue in Bulgaria (and most of Central and Eastern Europe, for that matter).
VAT as a share in total tax revenue increased in importance after its intro-
duction and implementation in 1994 from 25% of total tax revenue to 35%
in the years following the currency board implementation (in 1997), where
the increase was due to the macroeconomic stability that was achieved by
fixing the Bulgarian lev (BGN) to the German mark at parity. Post-1997, the
share of VAT revenue in total government revenue increased further until
it leveled off at approximately 45% of total tax revenue after Bulgaria’s EU
accession in 2007, and the subsequent income tax reforms that followed -
the introduction of 10% proportional (flat) tax rate on both corporate profit,
and individual income, as of 2007 and 2008, respectively.
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Since the VAT revenue makes almost half of total tax revenue in Bul-
garia, most of the tax collection problems are associated with this category,
especially after the substantial simplification of the income tax code and
the sizable decrease in the income tax rates, both on corporate profit and
individual income, as of 2007 and 2008, respectively.1 The term used by
fiscal authority is called the ”VAT gap,” which is defined as the difference
between the expected VAT revenue less the VAT actually collected by tax
authorities. This ”VAT gap”, or the size of the evaded VAT, is what this pa-
per aims to assess, and where the major contribution of the study lies. This
paper uses modern quantitative macroeconomic theory to estimate the size
of the loss from the VAT evasion at aggregate level, and we focus on the pe-
riod following the introduction of the currency board.2 The setup in this pa-
per is a relatively standard micro-founded general-equilibrium framework
populated by a unit mass of households and augmented with a revenue-
extraction mechanism as in Vasilev (2017). Similarly to Angelopoulos et
al. (2009, 2011), each one-member household can decide to spend working
time on rent-seeking activities and try to hide (or equivalently, ”extract”)
part of the VAT revenue from the government. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no such setup, explicitly focusing on VAT evasion, exists for transition
and/or development countries. Using models that are disciplined by both
theory and data are useful tools to inform policy makers on issues, whose ef-
fects are otherwise hard to measure. After all, model-based estimates of the
losses associated with VAT fraud for transition and developing countries,
based on optimal behavior, are missing from the public finance literature.
Lastly, the study in this paper could be also relevant for Eastern European
countries considering EU accession (Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia-FYROM) and ones that generate most of
the tax revenue in the form of trade and border taxes, e.g. Kosovo.
Furthermore, the study adds value to an older literature, the Computable
General Equilibrium (CGE) literature, e.g., as represented by the work in de
Melo et al. (1992), who computes a model for Madagascar, and also find
substantial losses from VAT evasion. However, in contrast to the CGE liter-
ature, our model belongs to the much more modern literature, the Dynamic
General Equilibrium (DGE) class of models, which, in contrast to the static
ad hoc CGE models, are micro-founded and deeply rooted in optimization.
VAT evasion in this paper arises as a conscious choice made by individuals,
who compare the benefits and the costs of engaging in tax fraud. Our study
also differs in important ways from Angelopoulos et al. (2009), who use a
1 In another line of research, as shown in Vasilev (2015a), the move from progressive to
proportional taxation of income has significantly decreased the size of the grey economy
in Bulgaria.
2 For simplicity and better model tractability, the setup presented in this paper will abstract
away from excise taxes, such as taxes on tobacco, alcohol, fuel, and gambling. Neverthe-
less, the model still captures smuggling and contraband, as cigarettes and fuel are both
levied with the VAT, and with the excise tax.
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similar model to focus on overall tax evasion and the cost of rent-seeking
in EU-12 member states in the form of captured ”income transfers, subsi-
dies and preferential tax treatment.” In contrast, the present study focuses
on the ”sales tax” evasion aspect of VAT evasion, which is connected to the
interaction between retail sellers and buyers.
Yet another strand of literature that our paper adds value to are micro-
simulation studies of the macroeconomic effects of consumption tax reform
in Western Europe: Kehoe et al. (1988) focuses on the VAT reform in Spain
from 1986, while Alvarez-Martinez and Polo (2014) focus on tax reforms in
Spain during the Great Depression; a very recent study by Bye et al. (2015)
discusses the VAT reform in Norway. However, Bulgaria (as well as Alba-
nia and Croatia) is a particular case in the EU, since its VAT rate is non-
differentiated, and all consumption goods are levied with the same rate.
Thus, most of the studies on Western European countries are of very lim-
ited relevance to the research in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
model setup, Section 3 describes the model calibration, Section 4 character-
izes the symmetric steady-state, Section 5 evaluates the welfare effects of
some institutional reforms, and Section 6 discusses some of the model as-
sumptions and limitations. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model Description
There is a unit mass of households who derive utility out of consump-
tion, leisure and public services. The time available to households can be
spent in productive or in activities leading to VAT evasion. The benefit from
opportunistic behavior is measured in terms of the share of extracted VAT
payments. Thus, the government is not able to collect all the tax revenue,
and will spend less on utility-enhancing public purchases and government
transfers. On the production side, there is a representative firm, which pro-
duces a homogeneous final good, which could be used for consumption,
investment, or government purchases.
2.1 Households
There is a unit mass of one-member households, indexed by i. Each
household i maximizes its utility function:
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln cit + γ ln[1− hit] + ln gct
}
, (1)
where cit denotes household’s i private consumption in period t, hit are
non-leisure hours in period t, gct is per-household consumption of public
services, 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, and γ > 0 is the relative weight
that each household attaches to leisure.
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Each household i starts with an initial stock of physical capital ki0, and
has to decide how much to add to it in the form of new investment. Every
period physical capital depreciates at a rate δ, 0 < δ < 1. The law of motion
for physical capital is then
ki,t+1 = iit + (1− δ)kit, (2)
and the real interest rate is rt, hence the before-tax capital income of house-
hold i in period t equals rtkit.
In addition to capital income, each household can generate labor income.
However, not all hours are spent in productive activities: only ηit share, 0 <
ηit < 1, is dedicated to working in the representative firm, where the hourly
wage rate is wt, so labor income equals wtηithit. The remaining hours, (1 −
ηit)hit, are used to engage in activities, whose aim is to evade paying VAT
taxes.3 The reward from engaging in VAT evasion is that the household can
capture a share of the lost aggregate VAT tax revenue from the government,
and thus augment its income. The ”prize,” or the rent, obtained as a result of
the opportunistic behavior, Rit, is represented by the following technology,
which is akin to the one used in Angelopoulos et al. (2009, 2011):
Rit = θτ
cCt
(1− ηit)hit∑
i(1− ηit)hit
, (3)
where τ c is the VAT/consumption tax rate, Ct denotes aggregate consump-
tion, and τ cCt represents total VAT revenue in period t. Since the individual
household is assumed to be small relative to the aggregate, Ct is taken as
given. Parameter θ, 0 < θ < 1, is the efficiency of the rent-seeking technol-
ogy) while (1−ηit)hit∑
i(1−ηit)hit is the endogenous probability of winning the ”prize”
(or getting a larger per-household ”slice” of the rent pie). This probability
is positively related to the own time spent evading taxes, and negatively re-
lated to the time other households’ spend in tax evasion. In other words, ev-
ery period each household will be playing the non-cooperative Nash equi-
librium strategy against other households in a repeated strategic setup. Ev-
ery household, taking the time rent seeking by its opponents as given, ded-
icates time resource to increase its slice (or the chance of winning). This
optimality condition holds true for any household. At the end, the Nash
equilibrium will be described as a situation when each household’s best re-
sponse is a best response to the other households’ best responses.
The rent is determined to depend on aggregate, rather than simply on in-
dividual consumption, since some individuals might own larger companies
that would extract much more than a quantity proportional to one’s individ-
ual consumption: In Bulgaria, as in many other (Eastern) European coun-
tries, it is the retail merchant who is obliged by law to transfer the tax owed
3 One example of such activity would represent the opening of an ”empty” firm with no
activity, so that all expenses are registered as investment goods (and thus exempt of VAT),
while in fact they are used for consumption purposes.
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to the tax revenue agency, since firms are owned by individuals, assuming
that individuals directly evade the VAT (or through firm ownership) in the
model is a useful simplification, which does not decrease the contribution
of the paper, or affect the main results of the study in any major way.4
Next, household i’s problem can be now simplified to
max
{ct,ηt,ht,kt+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln cit + γ ln[1− (1− ηit)hit − ηithit] + ln gct
}
(4)
s.t.
(1+τ c)cit+ki,t+1−(1−δ)kit = (1−τy)[wtηithit+rtkit+pi]+gtit+θτ cCt
(1− ηit)hit∑
i(1− ηit)hit
,
(5)
where τ y is the proportional income tax rate (0 < τ y < 1), levied on both
labor and capital income, pi denotes household i’s profit income, and gtit is
household i’s government transfer. The problem generates the following
optimality conditions:
cit :
1
cit
= λt(1 + τ
c) (6)
ki,t+1 : λt = βλt+1[1 + (1− τ y)rt+1 − δ] (7)
ηithit :
γ
1− hit = λt(1− τ
y)wt (8)
(1− ηit)hit : γ
1− hit = λtθτ
cCt
1∑
i(1− ηit)hit
(9)
TV C : lim
t→∞
βtλtKt+1 = 0, (10)
where Kt denotes aggregate physical capital in period t, and λt is the La-
grangean multiplier attached to household i’s budget constraint in period
t.
The interpretation of the first-order conditions above is standard: the
first one states that for each household, the marginal utility of consump-
tion equals the marginal utility of wealth, corrected for the consumption
tax rate. The second equation is the so-called ”Euler condition,” which de-
scribes how each household chooses to allocate physical capital over time.
Next, at the margin, each hour spent working for the firm should balance
the benefit from doing so in terms of additional income generates, and the
cost measured in terms of lower utility of leisure. Similarly, at the margin,
an hour spent rent-seeking should equate the benefit (in terms of captured
VAT revenue) and the utility cost. The last condition is called the ”transver-
sality condition” (TVC): it states that at the end of the horizon, the value of
physical capital should be zero.
4 The shortcut taken in this paper is also useful, as it might be viewed as an approach that
captures the collusion between individuals and tax officers, as big VAT evasion schemes
usually have an inside help and protection in the face of politicians, tax inspectors, cus-
toms officials, and/or police officers.
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2.2 Firm
There is a representative firm in the economy, which produces a homoge-
neous product. The price of output is normalized to unity. The production
technology is Cobb-Douglas and uses both physical capital, kf , and labor
hours, hf , to maximize static profit
Πt = A(k
f
t )
α(hft )
1−α − rtkft − wthft , (11)
where A denotes the level of technology. Since the firm rents the capital
from households, the problem of the firm is a sequence of static profit max-
imizing problems. In equilibrium, there are no profits, and each input is
priced according to its marginal product, i.e.:
kft : α
yt
kft
= rt, (12)
hft : (1− α)
yt
hft
= wt. (13)
2.3 Government
In the model setup, the government is levying taxes on labor and capi-
tal income, as well as consumption in order to finance spending on utility-
enhancing government purchases. However, due to VAT evasion (which
could be due to inefficiencies in the way tax officials operate), the govern-
ment is able to collect only 1− θ share of the consumption tax revenue. The
government budget constraint is as follows:
gct +
∑
i
gtit = (1− θ)τ c
∑
i
cit + τ
y[wt
∑
i
ηithit + rt
∑
i
kit] (14)
Government consumption-to-output ratio would be obtained from the mar-
ket clearing condition (resource constraint), and government transfers would
be determined residually in each period so that the government budget is
always balanced.
2.4 Market Clearing
In addition to the optimality conditions from the household’s and firm’s
problem, as presented in the previous subsections, and the government
budget constraint above, we need to impose consistency among the differ-
ent decisions. More specifically, this would require that in equilibrium (i)
aggregate quantities equal the sum of individual allocations, and (ii) out-
put, capital and labor markets all clear, or for all t:∑
i
[
cit + ki,t+1 − (1− δ)kit
]
+ gct = yt (15)
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∑
i
cit = Ct (16)∑
i
gtit = g
t
t (17)∑
i
kit = k
f
t = Kt (18)∑
i
ηithit = h
f
t . (19)
2.5 Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium (DCE)
For a given level of technology A, average tax rates {τ c, τ y}, initial indi-
vidual capital endowments stock ki0,∀i, and aggregate allocations {Ct, Kt}∞t=0,
the decentralized dynamic competitive equilibrium is a list of sequences
{cit, iit, kit, ηit, hit}∞t=0 for each household i, input levels {kft , hft } chosen by
the firm in each time period t, a sequence of government purchases and
transfers {gct , gtt}∞t=0, and input prices {wt, rt}∞t=0 such that (i) each household
imaximizes its utility function subject to its budget constraint; (ii) the repre-
sentative firm maximizes profit; (iii) government budget is balanced in each
period; (iv) all markets clear.
2.5.1 Symmetric DCE
In the general, non-symmetric, case it is very difficult to solve the system
defined in the subsection above. More specifically, the model in its general
formulation can generate a multitude of distributions of capital stock hold-
ings across households, and in this sense, the equilibrium is indeterminate.
Therefore, we will concentrate on a particular equilibrium, one in which all
households are identical, or the symmetric solution. This requires setting
ki0 = k0, and imposing symmetry in the DCE system for all i, which in turn
greatly simplifies the optimality conditions derived above. Since the model
features a unit mass of households, this produces cit = Ct, kit = Kt, hit =
ht, ηit = ηt, etc. In addition, in the symmetric equilibrium every household
will receive an equal share of the pie, or the rent from VAT evasion will be
spread uniformly (note that total rent is nowRt = θτ cCt). Indeed, this might
be a shortcoming of the setup, but since the main objective is to make a pre-
diction about the aggregate size of the VAT extracted, not how the degree
of evasion is distributed across the population, the focus on the symmetric
DCE is not a significant limitation of the analysis.
3 Data and Model Calibration
To compute the size of VAT evasion in Bulgaria, we will focus on the
period after the introduction of the currency board (1999-2014). Data on
output, consumption and investment was collected from National Statisti-
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cal Institute (2015), while the real interest rate is taken from Bulgarian Na-
tional Bank Statistical Database (2015). The calibration strategy described in
this section follows a long-established tradition in modern macroeconomics:
first, the discount factor, β = 0.937, is set to match the steady-state capital-
to-output ratio in Bulgaria, k/y = 3.491, in the steady-state consumption-
Euler equation (7). The labor share parameter, α = 0.429, was obtained
as the average value of labor income in aggregate output over the period
1999-2014. This value is slightly higher as compared to other studies on de-
veloped economies, due to the overaccumulation of physical capital, which
was part of the ideology of the totalitarian regime, which was in place until
1989.
The relative weight attached to the utility out of leisure in the house-
hold’s utility function, γ, is calibrated to match that in steady-state con-
sumers would supply one-third of their time endowment to working. This
is in line with the estimates for Bulgaria as well over the period studied. The
depreciation rate of physical capital in Bulgaria, δ = 0.05, was taken from
Vasilev (2015b). It was estimated as the average depreciation rate over the
period 1999-2014. Due to the lack of additional information, the share of
working time used productively, η = 2/3, was set as in Angelopoulos et al.
(2011) from his study on Mexico. Alternatively, the share of working time
used in the VAT evasion technology, 1 − η = 1/3, could be pinned down as
the average hidden employment share as estimated by Center for the Study
of Democracy (2015). In other words, one third of the working time in Bul-
garia is assumed to be spent evading taxes. With its help, the value of θ, the
share of VAT tax evasion out of total consumption tax revenue, can be then
calibrated.5 Finally, the average income tax rate was set to τ y = 0.1. This is
the average effective tax rate on income between 1999-2007, when Bulgaria
used progressive income taxation, and equal to the proportional income tax
rate introduced as of 2008. Finally, the tax rate on consumption is set to its
value over the period, τ c = 0.2. Table 1 below summarizes the values of all
model parameters used in the paper.
4 Steady-state
Once the values of model parameters were obtained, the steady-state
equilibrium system solved, the ”big ratios” can be compared to their av-
erages in Bulgarian data. The results are reported in Table 2 on the next
page. The steady-state level of output was normalized to unity (hence the
level of technology A differs from one, which is usually the normalization
done in other studies), which greatly simplified the computations. Next,
the model matches consumption-to-output ratio by construction; The in-
vestment and government purchases ratios are also closely approximated,
5 In the Appendix, as a robustness check, we perform an alternative calibration procedure
for η and θ.
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Table 1 - Model Parameters
Parameter Value Description Method
β 0.937 Discount factor Calibrated
α 0.429 Capital Share Data average
1− α 0.571 Labor Share Calibrated
γ 0.867 Relative weight attached to leisure Calibrated
δ 0.050 Depreciation rate on physical capital Data average
η 0.670 Share of working hours used productively Set/Estimated
θ 0.867 Share of evaded VAT revenue Calibrated
τ y 0.100 Average tax rate on income Data average
τ c 0.200 VAT/consumption tax rate Data average
despite the closed-economy assumption and the absence of foreign trade
sector. The shares of income are also identical to those in data, which is
an artifact of the assumptions imposed on functional form of the aggregate
production function. The after-tax return, where r˜ = (1 − τ y)r − δ is also
relatively well-captured by the model.
Table 2 - Data Averages and Long-run Solution
Variable Description Data Model
y Steady-state output N/A 1.000
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.674 0.674
i/y Investment-to-output ratio 0.201 0.175
gc/y Government cons-to-output ratio 0.159 0.151
wηh/y Labor income-to-output ratio 0.571 0.571
rk/y Capital income-to-output ratio 0.429 0.429
h Share of time spent working 0.333 0.333
A Scale parameter of the production function N/A 1.095
r˜ After-tax net return on capital 0.056 0.067
θτ cc/y VAT evasion-to-output ratio 0.265 0.257
Next, the model predicts that the magnitude of VAT evasion relative to out-
put is approximately 26%. Using data from the National Revenue Agency,
Philip (2014) states that the size of VAT evasion relative to output is 0.265,
or to one-forth of the goods and services sold fiscal receipts have not been
issued. This is very close to the European Commission (2014) figure of 25%
as well. According to Boev and Boshnakov (2008), the share of success-
fully evaded VAT is between 16-35% on average in the form of turnover tax,
while World Bank estimates (in Pashev 2006) amount to one-third of VAT
revenue being evaded. Bulgarian tax authorities themselves compute the
evasion to be 20-45% of VAT revenues. Given that VAT makes almost half
of total tax revenue, those figures are in line with the model estimates. All
across the range, VAT evasion represents a significant loss when compared
to aggregate output.
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5 Policy Experiment
In this section we will consider a computational experiment, which would
correspond to an improvement of institutional quality on the side of the
government. In particular, the institutional reform that we will consider is
an increase of spending on law and order as a way to decrease the amount
of evaded VAT.6 This would allow to evaluate the welfare effect produced
by better policing, holding everything else in the model unchanged. As in
Vasilev (2015a), the welfare gain will be represented in the form of a con-
sumption gain, or more specifically, as the additional percentage by which
steady-state consumption under the benchmark case needs to be increased
to make the household as well off as under the steady-state with increases
spending on order and safety.7
Following Angelopoulos et al. (2009), the effective share of the pie (the
product of θ and hours ratio) is now amended to
θ0 = θ(g
p/y)−2
( (1− ηit)hit∑
i(1− ηit)hit
)1
, (20)
where gp denotes the new category of public spending - on order and safety
- and gp/y is the share of this program in output. parameters 1 and 2 are
the shares attached to each of the two components. The negative sign of
2 in the contest function is driven by the fact that more spending on law
and order is expected to decrease the amount of evaded VAT. Note that the
case 1 = 1, 2 = 0 corresponds to the rent-seeking function used in the
benchmark case without any spending on order and safety.
In this extension, we will set 2 = 0.032, which corresponds to the av-
erage share of order and safety in GDP.8 The change in the rent-seeking
function, and the introduction of a new government spending category will
amend the government budget constraint as follows:
gct + g
p
t + g
t
t = (1− θ)τ c
∑
i
cit + τ
y[wt
∑
i
ηithit + rt
∑
i
kit]. (21)
The model needs to be re-calibrated, and the corresponding steady-state
with spending on order and safety computed.9 Note that the new value of
6 The implicit assumption is that a larger spending corresponds to even larger increase in
efficiency of VAT collection.
7 Here we focus on the steady-state as we do not have time series data on the efficiency of
tax administration enforcement technology. This is what Angelopoulos et al. (2011) do
when they evaluate the effect of property rights enforcement.
8 The number is much larger than in most of the old EU member-states, and could be
explained as a heritage from the old regime: indeed, most of the Eastern European coun-
tries that joined the EU relatively recently have a larger share of public funds that is spent
on policing.
9 An interesting result is that the size of VAT evasion-to-output in the baseline case with
law and order is twice lower, or 13%. In addition, the welfare gain in consumption terms
is a bit more than 5% relative to the case of zero spending on law and order.
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gc/y was lowered to reflect the breakdown into two categories now. After
obtaining the new steady-state under the baseline spending on policing, we
would increase the spending on the government function (within a plausi-
ble range) to compute the quantitative effect on VAT evasion, and the pre-
dicted consumption-based gain to society. The results are documented in
Table 3 below. As seen from the table, there are substantial gains, which
are comparable in size to the gains computed in Angelopoulos et al. (2009).
Thus, a suitable increase in the budget on law and order (coupled with suit-
able increase in efficiency of law enforcement) could substantially increase
welfare by decreasing the losses from VAT evasion.10
Table 3 - Long-run Welfare Gain from Better VAT Collection
gp/y θ0 = θ(g
p/y)−ε2 Welfare gain (in % of additional steady-state consumption)
3.2% 0.968 -
4.0% 0.961 8.4
4.8% 0.955 11.5
5.6% 0.951 13.8
6 Discussion and Model Limitations
In this section we discuss the mechanics of the model, and some of the
potential limitations of the study, some of which due to the simplifying
modeling choices implemented in the theoretical setup. The reason why
in equilibrium a household would decide to engage in VAT evasion is that
the flows of extracted consumption tax revenue are seen as common prop-
erty resources, and in public-finance setups individual rationality turns out
to be sub-optimal from the perspective of society in general. Instead of delv-
ing into the source of government inefficiency, the model took as given the
authorities’ inability to collect all VAT, and proceeded to quantify the aggre-
gate cost of such evasion.
For simplicity, the analysis assumed that only households could engage
in VAT evasion, as in neoclassical economics firms are just production sets.
Indeed, as mentioned in the introduction, government officials could also be
part of such schemes, but solving for a full-blown political economy equi-
librium is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we decided to focus
on tractable exogenous policy experiments, such as the institutional reform
that results in an increased VAT collection by the government. In the model,
θ, was interpreted as the parameter determining the efficiency of the tax ad-
ministration, thus more spending on law and order led to a lower size of the
10 In the Appendix, we perform a sensitivity analysis to investigate how the results change
under alternative calibration for the two parameters associated with VAT evasion, η and
θ.
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pie, and a lower share of lost tax revenues. Lowering θ in turn lowers the
incentive to engage in tax evasion, hence η, the share of working time spent
at the firm, increases.
Another policy implication that can be drawn from this model is that if
τ c is lowered, that would also lower the prize. Differentiation of the tax rate,
e.g., having a lower tax on food and books, could be one such solution. Still,
this could trigger other forms of VAT fraud, unless such reforms are com-
plemented with better transparency in transactions.11 The fact that almost
half of the tax revenue comes from VAT, makes governments unwilling to
change the rate, as in that way they would lose a substantial amount of rev-
enue. After all, consumption tax is an example of a tax on demand, and
consumption spending is the largest part of aggregate demand.
Lastly, local tax authorities could introduce an information campaign,
and urge people to collect their receipts.12 In other words, instead of playing
the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium strategy, which results in a negative-
sum repeated game, the government can inform the households that they
are playing against each other, and thus they should behave cooperatively
(which leads to a zero-sum game). This would lead to no VAT evasion in
equilibrium, and all time will be spent working in the firm, ηt = 1 for all t.13
7 Conclusions
This paper uses modern quantitative macroeconomic theory to estimate
the size of the loss from the VAT evasion at aggregate level, and we focus
on the period following the introduction of the currency board in 1997. The
setup is a micro-founded framework populated by a unit mass of house-
holds and augmented with a revenue-extraction mechanism as in Vasilev
(2017). Similarly to Angelopoulos et al. (2009, 2011), each one-member
household can decide to spend working time on rent-seeking activities and
try to hide (or equivalently, ”extract”) part of the VAT revenue from the gov-
ernment. The model was calibrated to Bulgaria, as one of the few countries
in Europe (and the only one in the EU) with a non-differentiated consump-
tion tax rate, and where VAT revenue makes almost half of total govern-
ment tax revenue. Using models that are disciplined by both theory and
11 Some potential anti-fraud measures include the VAT account, and the so-called indicative
”market” prices of commercial transactions; Multi-phase credit schemes have also been
proposed. Yet another idea that has been circulated by economists is the harmonization
of tax rates, and integration of tax offices of EU countries, as part of the fiscal integration.
However, a detailed discussion of those is beyond the scope of this paper. The interested
reader should consult Pashev (2006) and the references therein.
12 This is what the National Revenue Agency is trying to achieve in its most recent cam-
paign (2015-16): receipts collected can be mailed to participate in lotteries with prizes
like smart phones, TV sets, even a car.
13 Such an outcome, though in a slightly different setup, is predicted also in Angelopoulos
et al. (2009). It is not clear whether such a trigger strategy is sustainable or not.
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data provides a useful tool to inform policy makers on issues, whose effects
are otherwise hard to measure. For example, a computational experiment
was performed, which estimated the size of evaded VAT to be a bit more
than one-fourth of output, a number which is in line with figures provided
in both Philip (2014) and the European Commission (2014). Policy experi-
ments based on the model show that suitable increases in spending on law
and order (coupled with suitable increase in efficiency of law enforcement)
could generate substantial welfare gains by decreasing the losses from VAT
evasion.
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Appendix: Sensitivity Analysis
In this appendix we perform an alternative calibration for η, the propor-
tion of time spend on productive labor, to see how the quantitative and the
qualitative results in the model are affected. As an extreme case, we follow
Angelopoulos et. al. (2009) and set η = 0.88, which corresponds to the aver-
age value obtained for the EU-12 countries. In other words, we compute the
size of VAT evasion for a hypothetical scenario for Bulgaria, in which Bul-
garia has achieved a level of institutional efficiency equal to one in EU-12.
The results in Table 4 below show that in such a scenario the VAT evasion
parameter would decrease to almost a third of the initial value, θ = 0.312.
In turn, the size of evaded VAT relative to output would go down to 17%.
Table A.1 - Data Averages and Long-run Solution
Variable Description Data Model
y Steady-state output N/A 1.000
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.674 0.674
i/y Investment-to-output ratio 0.201 0.175
gc/y Government cons-to-output ratio 0.159 0.227
wηh/y Labor income-to-output ratio 0.571 0.571
rk/y Capital income-to-output ratio 0.429 0.429
h Share of time spent working 0.333 0.333
A Scale parameter of the production function N/A 1.095
r˜ After-tax net return on capital 0.056 0.067
θτ cc/y VAT evasion-to-output ratio 0.265 0.166
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Next, we perform the same fiscal policy experiment described in section 5,
but under the alternative calibration for the VAT evasion parameters pre-
sented above, namely η = 0.88, and θ = 0.312. With only a third of con-
sumption revenue being lost by the government, the gains from increased
spending on police are larger, as there are lower inefficiencies in the model
economy, a higher proportion of total time is used productively, and thus
there is more production, and thus higher consumption and investment,
and more resources are available for both government transfers and valu-
able public services. In other words, there is a substantial complementarity
between a higher institutional quality (lower evasion) and more spending
on improving VAT collection (by hiring more tax inspectors, etc). Further-
more, as a result, there is double-digit consumption-equivalent welfare gain
from increasing spending on VAT collection improvement, and depending
on the magnitude of the expansion in the share of spending on policing,
households’ welfare increases by 11− 16.6% in the long-run.
Table A.2 - Long-run Welfare Gain from Better VAT Collection
gp/y θ0 = θ(g
p/y)−ε2 Welfare gain (in % of additional steady-state consumption)
3.2% 0.348 -
4.0% 0.341 11.18
4.8% 0.334 14.27
5.6% 0.329 16.58
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